In the past few years, the modus operandi of international relations and diplomacy has changed considerably. The world appears to have come full circle to the classic Melian Dialogue dictum: "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." Just when it seemed that the much-discussed "rise of the rest" was making the international order more plural and balanced, a sharp reversal led by the world’s most powerful nation under the unorthodox presidency of Donald Trump has challenged that assumption. The Trump presidency has reinforced an old but enduring truth: nothing commands outcomes quite like power.

What remains to be seen, however, is whether the brute exercise of power can lead to the creation of international structures capable of delivering lasting peace. That was, at least, the foundational assumption behind the US-led post–World War II institutional architecture, which has now completed nearly eight decades of existence.

The United States, under Trump’s second presidency, once again finds itself at the helm of reshaping the global institutional order though not necessarily a liberal one in the traditional sense. This recalibration is unfolding against the backdrop of a broader conservative and transactional turn in global politics. It is in this context that Donald Trump announced the creation of a Board of Peace(BoP) on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos. The initiative follows UN Resolution 2803 adopted in November last year. Structurally, the BoP consists of a chair and an executive committee, granting it sweeping authority over peace enforcement and reconstruction efforts.

By creating the BoP, Trump may have directly challenged the existing institutional order, if not bringing it to an abrupt end, and certainly signalling the beginning of its erosion. For the world’s largest economy and most powerful military actor, the temptation to rewrite the rules of global governance by imposing peace—particularly in a region as strategically vital as the Middle East may appear feasible. Yet history offers little reassurance. The Middle East has long been marked by cyclical instability, deep-rooted political grievances, and unresolved identity conflicts. Expecting a durable settlement in Gaza within a two-year timeframe (the BoP’s current mandate until 2027) appears overly optimistic. It is therefore likely that the Board’s mandate may need to be extended beyond 2027, subject to a fresh UN resolution.

For India, the invitation to join the BoP presents two competing impulses pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, participation could be timely, reflecting India’s expanding role in the Middle East and the broader Indo-Pacific. New Delhi’s strong bilateral ties with key regional actors, particularly Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, give it both credibility and stakes in any peace-building effort. On the other hand, the risks of association with a politically personalised and potentially short-lived framework are difficult to ignore.

The imprint of the Trump presidency looms large over the BoP initiative, irrespective of the widespread perception that it may be a fragile or even facetious framework. Yet one notable feature of the Board could be its ability under sustained pressure from Washington to bring together an unusual and ideologically diverse group of countries that would otherwise be unwilling to sit at the same negotiating table. Political differences over Gaza have, at least temporarily, been set aside to form an issue-based coalition under Trump’s chairmanship. In that sense, consolidating power under an unpredictable leadership style has demonstrated how coercive diplomacy can force cooperation, though not necessarily consensus.

The Trump administration has reportedly invited over 60 countries to participate in the BoP. While more than 20 have already joined, several others remain in various stages of deliberation. The hesitation stems from a fundamental concern that the BoP resembles a supranational or quasi-international body created precisely because existing liberal institutions, most notably the United Nations, have failed to deliver peace, stability, and reconstruction in Gaza. For countries that profess strong adherence to the UN Charter and multilateral norms, joining such a body is a difficult proposition. Yet the Trump administration has repeatedly demonstrated that, in its worldview, effectiveness trumps process and power, rather than legitimacy, is the primary currency of international politics.For India, the invitation to join the BoP presents two competing impulses pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, participation could be timely, reflecting India’s expanding role in the Middle East and the broader Indo-Pacific. New Delhi’s strong bilateral ties with key regional actors, particularly Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, give it both credibility and stakes in any peace-building effort. On the other hand, the risks of association with a politically personalised and potentially short-lived framework are difficult to ignore.

For India, Trump’s invitation strikes at the heart of a familiar strategic dilemma. Participation would place New Delhi within a select group of states empowered to override traditional institutional mandates in pursuit of peace in a region of immense strategic importance. At the same time, the absence of clear guardrails, accountability mechanisms, or a well-defined mandate makes the BoP a fraught undertaking. The initial two-year window until the end of 2027 is dramatically insufficient to stabilise Gaza, let alone reconstruct it. Moreover, sustained US commitment cannot be taken for granted in an era of volatile and personality-driven diplomacy.

Israel, meanwhile, remains circumspect despite joining the BoP. The inclusion of members such as Qatar, Turkey, and Pakistan may further strain Israel’s willingness to cooperate, making progress heavily dependent on pressure diplomacy from Washington rather than genuine convergence of interests.

Yet for India, the compulsion to be inside the tent may weigh heavily. With vast economic stakes in the Middle East, growing geopolitical influence, and a continuing desire to maintain equilibrium in its relationship with the United States, New Delhi must carefully weigh whether the risks of participation outweigh the costs of strategic absence. These compulsions have necessitated a wider discussion and calculation before Delhi gives its verdict.